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INTRODUCTION: FIRST DAY ON THE JOB 
In September 2015, Steve Lopez, a Los Angeles Times reporter, 
opened the Uber app for the first time and embarked on his first day as an 
Uber driver.1 After a moment of the “rookie jitters,” Steve picked up his 
first customer, Eloisa Lopez, whose destination was downtown Los 
Angeles.2 On his first day, Steve drove from 9 a.m. until 5 p.m. and again 
after 9 p.m.3 He drove a singer, several songwriters, a therapist, a radio 
executive, and a University of Southern California graduate.4 His patrons 
were enthusiastic about the convenience of Uber because it allowed them 
to drink without worrying about driving, arrive at their destinations 
without searching for parking, and pay electronically without needing 
cash.5 Steve, however, was not as satisfied as his customers. He broke 
down his earnings for the day and found that he made only $12.22 an hour 
after deducting Uber’s cut of the fares and the cost of gas.6 The total did 
not account for the cost of car insurance or the wear and tear on his car.7 
Steve ultimately decided that Uber was great for passengers but “yet 
another industry that might one day make a few people staggeringly rich 
on the backs of workers who struggle to eke out a living wage[.]”8 
Recently, the American workforce has shifted toward a new demand 
for “gig workers,” like Uber and Lyft drivers, who use smartphone 
applications to engage in on-demand services.9 The MBO Partners, a 
privately owned business that assists independent contractors and those 
that employ them,10 created an Independent Workforce Index to track the 
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 1. Steve Lopez, After Driving for Uber, he’s keeping his day job, L.A. TIMES 
(Sept. 19, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-0920-lopez-
uber-20150920-column.html [https://perma.cc/4U88-6K8V]. 
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 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. SARAH A. DONOVAN, DAVID H. BRADLEY & JON O. SHIMABUKURO, 
WHAT DOES THE GIG ECONOMY MEAN FOR WORKERS? (Cong. Research Serv. 
2016). 
 10. About MBO Partners, MBO PARTNERS, http://www.mbopartners.com/ 
about [https://perma.cc/E8R8-NANV] (last visited Feb. 7, 2019). The MBO 
Partners was created to assist independent contractors and businesses that employ 
independent contractors in building and maintaining successful work 
relationships. Part of MBO Partners’ mission statement is to see most of 




gig worker sector’s growth and reported that the number of gig workers 
rose by 8.2% in 2011, 2.7% in 2012, and is expected to increase.11 As of 
2016, there were 3.8 million gig workers in America.12 The MBO Partners 
describe the rise of gig-related jobs as a “structural shift” in the workforce 
rather than “a blip[] in the jobs economy.”13 These gig workers, including 
the rideshare industry, are part of an emerging job market here to stay.14 
Debate surrounds whether the government should classify gig workers 
as employees or independent contractors under the National Labor 
Relations Act (“NLRA”) and other laws.15 The NLRA governs the 
collective bargaining rights of workers classified as employees but excludes 
workers classified as independent contractors from coverage.16 If the NLRA 
considers rideshare drivers employees, they can engage in collective 
bargaining and file unfair labor practice charges under the NLRA to contest 
an employer’s unilateral decisions.17 If rideshare drivers are considered 
independent contractors, they cannot engage in these actions.18 Instead, 
                                                                                                             
America’s workforce shift towards self-employment. The MBO Partners’ 
research on gig workers has been published and cited in Fortune, the Washington 
Business Journal, and Forbes. Id. 
 11. MBO Partners, The State of Independence in America, THIRD ANNUAL 
INDEPENDENT WORKFORCE REPORT 4 (Sept. 2013), https://www.mbopartners 
.com/uploads/files/state-of-independence-reports/2013-MBO_Partners_State_of  
_Independence_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/LHE3-5AJF] (noting that the number 
of gig workers “rose yet again: up 2.7% over 2012 and 8.2% over the base year 
2011”). 
 12. Rani Molla, The gig economy workforce will double in four years, RECODE 
(May 25, 2017, 12:27 PM), https://www.recode.net/2017/5/25/15690106/gig-on-
demand-economy-workers-doubling-uber [https://perma.cc/MX4V-CDEU] (“9.2 
million Americans are expected to work in the gig economy by 2021 . . . .”). 
 13. MBO Partners, supra note 11, at 4. 
 14. See id. 
 15. Jimmy Frost, Uber and the Gig Economy: Can the Legal World Keep 
Up?, 13 No. 2 ABA SCITECH LAW. 4, 5 (Winter 2017).  
 16. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2012). 
 17. See generally id. 
 18. See generally id. § 158(d) (“[T]o bargain collectively is the performance 
of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees 
to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, 
and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but 
such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the 
making of a concession . . . .”). 




rideshare drivers would have to organize and attempt to make workplace 
changes without NLRA protections and regulations.19 
Courts and Congress have failed to properly clarify on drivers’ status, 
so drivers’ labor rights are subject to labor regulations that vary from city 
to city and state to state,20 leaving many workers without protection.21 If 
drivers work in a city that does not allow rideshare workers to unionize, 
the drivers must depend on themselves, rather than a union, for protections 
against pay changes, terminations, and unilateral employer decisions.22 
A recent case from a federal district court in Washington, Clark v. City 
of Seattle, highlights the conflicts that occur among federal, state, and local 
labor laws when a city permits rideshare drivers, who may be classified as 
independent contractors, to unionize.23 Clark focused on a Seattle 
ordinance that circumvented the classification debate and declared 
rideshare drivers classified as independent contractors can unionize and 
engage in collective bargaining.24 The solution to the independent 
contractor–employee debate, therefore, is not relevant in Seattle because 
either classification results in the same protection of rights to organize and 
                                                                                                             
 19. Id. Organizing and bargaining is possible without NLRA coverage, but it is 
a difficult and sometimes impossible process because independent contractors lack 
NLRA regulations and protections that force the process along. For example, public 
sector employees—also excluded from NLRA coverage—make up public sector 
unions, but there are major restrictions to the bargaining abilities depending on the 
state. See, e.g., Garrett Epps, Will the Supreme Court Unravel Public Employee 
Unions?, ATLANTIC (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/20 
17/10/will-the-supreme-court-unravel-public-employee-unions/542382/ [https://per 
ma.cc/WNW3-2NWH]. 
 20. See generally SEATTLE, WA., MUN. CODE ch. 6.310, § 1(A) (2015). This 
classification issue also arises under other state and federal labor and employment 
laws, such as the Fair Labor Standards Act. See generally Fair Labor Standards 
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 202 (2012). 
 21. See generally MUN. ch. 6.310, § 1(A). The ordinance allows rideshare 
drivers to unionize and drivers working in cities other than Seattle do not have the 
same labor protections from employers. Id. 
 22. See, e.g., Complaint at 6–9, Van v. Rasier, L.L.C., No. 2:17-CV-02550, 
2017 WL 1278763 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2017).  
 23. Clark v. City of Seattle, No. C17-0382RSL, 2017 WL 3641908, at *1 
(W.D. Wash. Aug. 24, 2017). 
 24. Id. The city of Seattle foreshadowed that the classification debate in the 
courts and Congress will result in rideshare drivers being classified as independent 
contractors. The classification debate has not been solved, but Seattle gave 
unionization and collective bargaining protections to rideshare drivers in the event 
they are classified as independent contractors. Id. 




bargain collectively.25 The NLRA does not preempt local regulation such 
as the Seattle Ordinance because independent contractors are excluded 
from the NLRA’s scope.26 Thus, local ordinances that regulate rideshare 
drivers’ collective bargaining rights allow cities to decide for themselves 
whether rideshare workers can unionize.27 
Federal regulation of rideshare workers’ collective bargaining rights 
would create uniformity and provide important protections for a growing 
sector of the American workforce.28 The NLRA’s current definition of 
“employee” does not include rideshare drivers, but Congress should 
amend the definition to categorize all gig workers as employees.29 The 
amendment should have two aims: (1) to recognize rideshare drivers as a 
modern part of the American workforce; and (2) to provide regulation for 
drivers’ collective bargaining rights.30 Until the NLRA definition of 
employee encompasses gig workers, the regulation of rideshare drivers 
will be left to local or state governments—and as a result,31 inconsistent 
labor protections and unpredictable markets for rideshare drivers.32 
National companies, like Uber, will have to accommodate for changed 
regulations to avoid litigation or federal and state action, but uniformity 
overcomes these variations in the law, replacing confusion with certainty 
across the board. 
This Comment addresses the advantages of regulating gig workers, 
specifically rideshare drivers, at the federal level and demonstrates how an 
amendment to the NLRA accomplishes that regulation. Part I explains the 
relevant NLRA provisions, focusing on the history of the classification 
debate surrounding rideshare drivers and the related balance between 
federal, state, and local labor laws. Part II presents Clark v. City of Seattle, 
the case challenging the Seattle Ordinance, and analyzes Clark in light of 
a current circuit split. Part III discusses the possible NLRA preemption of 
the Seattle Ordinance. Part III also suggests that Congress amend the 
NLRA’s employee definition to include gig workers and allow collective 
                                                                                                             
 25. Id. 
 26. 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2012). 
 27. See generally SEATTLE, WA., MUN. ch. 6.310, § 1(A) (2015). 
 28. Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Law of Termination: Doing More with Less, 68 
MD. L. REV. 89, 132–50 (2008). 
 29. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 152. 
 30. See, e.g., Council Directive 2008/104, art. 1, 2008 O.J. (L 327) (EC). 
 31. See generally MUN. ch. 6.310, § 1(A). 
 32. Id. Seattle rideshare drivers have labor protections that drivers in cities 
without regulations do not. But see Council Directive 2008/104, art. 1, 2008 O.J. 
(L 327) (EC) (addressing drivers on the federal level creates uniform protections 
for drivers regardless of the city they work in). 




bargaining of gig workers to be regulated at the federal level. This 
Comment concludes by advocating for an amendment to the NLRA that 
provides necessary federal regulation of rideshare drivers’ collective 
bargaining rights. 
I. THE CLASSIFICATION DILEMMA 
The classification debate begins with the delicate balance of federal, 
state, and local labor laws.33 Federal labor laws preempt local regulation 
when Congress determines the federal interest in having consistent 
governance of employer–employee relationships is greater than the state or 
local government interest in regulating labor rights.34 Labor law preemption 
is a primarily court-made doctrine, so court interpretations of preemption 
are essential to determine the balance between federal, state, and local labor 
laws.35 
A. History of the NLRA 
In 1935, Congress passed the NLRA, giving itself the power to 
regulate the collective bargaining rights of employees.36 Collective 
bargaining is the method labor organizations and employers use to 
negotiate the terms and conditions of employment, including pay and 
wage, group insurance, seniority benefits, and overtime.37 Congress 
enacted the NLRA to encourage collective bargaining between employers 
                                                                                                             
 33. Theresa L. Corrada & Roberto L. Corrada, Federal Preemption of State 
Employment Laws and Claims, in 16 COLO. PRAC., EMPLOYMENT LAW & 
PRACTICE § 14.7 (3d ed.). 
 34. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, Millmen’s Union, Local 2020 v. 
Garmon (Garmon), 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959) (“When it is clear or may fairly be 
assumed that the activities which a State purports to regulate are protected by § 7 
of the National Labor Relations Act, or constitute an unfair labor practice under § 
8, due regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must 
yield.”). 
 35. Corrada & Corrada, supra note 33. The NLRA does not explicitly state 
the parameters of labor law preemption. “Unlike ERISA preemption, which is 
based on express statutory law, preemption of state law by federal labor laws is a 
combination of statutory preemption and court-made doctrine.” Id. 
 36. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012). Collective bargaining “is the performance of the 
mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet 
at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment.” Id. § 158(d). 
 37. TERRY L. LEAP, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND LABOR RELATIONS 7 (1991). 




and employees and to protect workers’ “freedom of association.”38 The 
NLRA’s intent was “to resolve differences [between employers and 
employees]—to compromise—rather than to engage in protracted 
combat.”39 The NLRA also seeks to protect employees who do not wish 
to engage in collective bargaining.40 The NLRA regulates collective 
bargaining and ensures that employers do not interfere with employees’ 
right to join a labor organization.41 
Section 2 of the NLRA defines a labor organization as an organization 
that exists to address employee grievances with their employers.42 A union 
is a type of labor organization that organizes employees and facilitates 
conversations with employers about working conditions, and workers join 
unions to engage in collective bargaining.43 Although unions serve as the 
most popular avenue for collective bargaining, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit in Electromation v. NLRB held that the term “labor 
organization” has been broadly construed to include any group that 
organizes for purposes of “‘dealing with’ the employer.”44 In 
Electromation, the court concluded that action committees the employer 
created qualified as labor organizations under the broad construction of 
the definition Congress promulgated.45 
In addition to defining a labor organization, § 2 defines workers that 
fall within NLRA coverage.46 It regulates and protects employees, 
circularly defining employees as “any employee” and making it difficult 
to determine who is classified as an employee.47 The NLRA’s employee 
exclusions, however, are helpful.48 The NLRA specifically defines what 
an employee is not: “The term ‘employee’ . . . shall not include . . . any 
                                                                                                             
 38. 29 U.S.C. § 151. Freedom of association means an employee’s right to 
join or not join a group that advocates for labor rights. Id. 
 39. HAROLD W. DAVEY ET AL., CONTEMPORARY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
32 (1951). 
 40. Id. at 41 (“[F]ederal law has also sought to protect employees in their right 
to refrain from self-organization and collective bargaining if they so desire.”). 
 41. 29 U.S.C. § 157. 
 42. Id. § 152(5) (A labor organization is “any organization of any kind . . . in 
which employees participate and which exists for the purpose . . . of dealing with 
employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of 
employment, or conditions of work”). 
 43. DAVEY ET AL., supra note 39. 
 44. Electromation, Inc. v. NLRB, 35 F.3d 1148, 1159 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 45. Id. 
 46. 29 U.S.C. § 152. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. § 152(3). 




individual having the status of an independent contractor . . . .”49 This 
defined exclusion removes a significant group of workers from NLRA 
coverage.50 
In response to the vague definition of employee, courts have 
developed several tests to distinguish between independent contractors 
and employees.51 There is no concrete distinction between the 
classifications, but most jurisprudential tests revolve around the level of 
employer control.52 In NLRB v. United Insurance Co. of America, the 
United States Supreme Court applied the common law agency test that 
focuses on the employer’s control over the worker’s everyday life and held 
that debt agents were employees rather than independent contractors under 
the NLRA.53 In a 2017 case, Minnesota Timberwolves Basketball, the 
National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”)54 reaffirmed the common law 
agency test and held that crew members for a basketball team were 
employees rather than independent contractors because their employer 
exercised considerable control over their work, and the crew members did 
not have any proprietary interest in the team.55 The NLRB, which has 
jurisdiction to establish tests that concern labor rights, restated that the 
common law agency test is based on the Restatement (Second) Agency 
factors, such as skill required, control, and method of payment, with no 
                                                                                                             
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See Gray v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 799 F.3d 995, 1000 (8th 
Cir. 2015); Carlson v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 787 F.3d 1313, 1318 
(11th Cir. 2015); NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968). 
 52. See Gray, 799 F.3d at 1000; Carlson, 787 F.3d at 1318; United Ins. Co. 
of Am., 390 U.S. at 256. 
 53. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. at 256 (holding that the debt agents were 
employees because the debt agents did not have a large amount of decision 
making authority; the debt agents performed tasks as part of the company’s 
normal operations, the agents were trained by company personnel, and the debt 
agents did business under the company’s name). 
 54. The National Labor Relations Board is the five-member body that 
governs labor rights. When a case begins, the Regional Director investigates the 
claim and can either report it to an administrative law judge or dismiss the claim. 
The administrative law judge then has a formal trial and rules on the claim. The 
NLRB hears any appeals, and U.S. courts of appeal hear the appeals from the 
NLRB’s decision, with the Supreme Court acting as the last step in the appeal 
process. See The NLRB Process, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/resources/nlrb-
process [https://perma.cc/DK2L-LUQJ] (last visited Feb. 7, 2019). 
 55. Minn. Timberwolves Basketball, LP & Int’l All. of Theatrical Stage 
Emp., 365 N.L.R.B. 124 (2017). 




factor standing alone.56 These jurisprudential tests are necessary in the 
classification debate because neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has 
applied the test to gig workers. 
Even more recently, a judge applied a similar control test to GrubHub 
drivers in a California district case.57 In Lawson v. GrubHub, Inc., a 
California judge for the Northern District of California held that 
GrubHub’s employer correctly classified delivery drivers as independent 
contractors.58 The judge applied the Borello test59 to determine employee 
or independent contractor status, which includes a variety of secondary 
factors such as method of payment and scheduling, but primarily focused 
on the control the worker-drivers have over their duties.60 Ultimately, the 
judge held that Lawson, a GrubHub delivery driver, was an independent 
contractor because he had control over his schedule, and GrubHub 
exhibited very little control over where, when, and how Lawson chose to 
make his deliveries.61 Similarly, courts would likely classify rideshare 
drivers as independent contractors under the Borello test because rideshare 
drivers are engaged in a very similar type of work as GrubHub delivery 
drivers.62 
B. The New Kind of Worker 
Gig workers are part of a new American workforce that provide 
services to consumers on a job-or-gig basis and have sparked much debate 
about their NLRA classification.63 The Congressional Research Service 
described a “gig worker” as someone who answers on-demand service 
calls from customers using technology-based apps on smartphones.64 The 
                                                                                                             
 56. Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (AM. LAW INST. 
1958). 
 57. Lawson v. GrubHub, Inc., No. 15-CV-05128-JSC, 2017 WL 1684964, at 
*1 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2017). 
 58. Id. 
 59. S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 48 Cal. 3d 341, 
350–51 (1989). To determine whether a worker is an employee or an independent 
contractor, the Supreme Court of California adopted a multi-factor test that 
centers around the element of control. Id. at 354–59. The court determines who 
has the “right to control the work.” Id. at 354. 
 60. Lawson, 2017 WL 1684964, at *1. 
 61. Id.  
 62. Id.  
 63. Frost, supra note 15. 
 64. John Utz, What Is A “Gig”? Benefits for Unexpected Employees, PRAC. 
LAW. 19, 20 (June 2016), http://files.ali-cle.org/thumbs/datastorage/lacidoirep 
/articles/TPL1606-Utz_thumb.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3HG-HMYD]. 




U.S. Supreme Court has yet to rule on the classification of Uber and Lyft 
drivers,65 and the lower courts have struggled to categorize drivers because 
gig workers are unique and new.66 Employee status gives rideshare drivers 
NLRA collective bargaining rights, but independent contractor status does 
not.67 Independent contractor status requires that rideshare drivers 
negotiate with employers on their own.68 Most rideshare companies, 
including Uber and Lyft, consider drivers to be independent contractors.69  
The rideshare companies benefit if drivers are independent contractors 
because the companies can change contract terms—such as pay, surge 
times, and commission—at will.70 An Uber driver in a recent California 
district court case alleged that Uber unilaterally imposed an “upfront 
pricing model” in 2017 that calculated longer routes for drivers, which 
resulted in a bigger cut for Uber.71 For example, Uber advertises that it 
takes around 25% of the fare, but one driver tracked his fares and 
concluded that Uber takes up to 54% at times.72 A rideshare company can 
even deactivate a driver from the Uber application, which effectively 
eliminates a source of income.73 If drivers are classified as employees 
under the NLRA, collective bargaining rights would enable them to 
engage in negotiations with rideshare companies to discuss pay, surge 
times, commission, and termination issues through unions serving as their 
collective bargaining representatives.74 Without collective bargaining, the 
                                                                                                             
 65. Pamela A. Izvanariu, Matters Settled but Not Resolved: Worker 
Misclassification in the Rideshare Sector, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 133, 172 (2016). 
 66. Frost, supra note 15. 
 67. 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2012). 
 68. See, e.g., FREELANCERS UNION, https://www.freelancersunion.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/EBA6-M962] (last visited Feb. 7, 2019). 
 69. Ryan B. Frazier, Sharing is caring: Are Uber, Lyft Drivers independent 
contractors?, UTAH EMP. L. LETTER (Oct. 14, 2016, 5:00 AM), https://www.km 
claw.com/newsroom-articles-367.html [https://perma.cc/E7JB-MN8S]. 
 70. Natasha Singer, In the Sharing Economy Workers Find Both Freedom 
and Uncertainty, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014 
/08/17/technology/in-the-sharing-economy-workers-find-both-freedom-and-un  
certainty.html [https://perma.cc/8DKT-QHCL]. 
 71. Complaint at 6–8, Van v. Rasier, L.L.C., No. 2:17-CV-02550, 2017 WL 
1278763 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2017). 
 72. Harry Campbell, What’s the Real Commission that Uber Takes From 
Drivers, MAXIMIZING RIDESHARE PROFITS BLOG (July 25, 2016), https://max 
imumridesharingprofits.com/whats-real-commision-uber-takes-drivers/ [https://per 
ma.cc/JT87-ZLKN]. 
 73. Singer, supra note 70. 
 74. 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2012). 




drivers must rely on their individual contract negotiations with rideshare 
companies as opposed to a powerful group effort.75 
C. Seattle’s Ordinance: The First of Its Kind 
Reporters describe Seattle’s Ordinance 124968 (“Seattle Ordinance” 
or “Ordinance”) as the “first of its kind” because it goes beyond the scope 
of the NLRA and specifically protects for-hire drivers despite their 
independent contractor status.76 In December 2015, Seattle passed the 
Ordinance, which gave rideshare drivers who are independent 
contractors77 the right to engage in collective bargaining and created an 
avenue for them to form bargaining units to negotiate for payment 
increases, vehicle safety, and driver input on employer decisions.78 Seattle 
passed the Ordinance at a time of intense nationwide debate between 
employers and workers regarding whether rideshare drivers should be 
considered independent contractors or employees for union organization 
purposes.79 Seattle passed the Ordinance as a part of its power to regulate 
transportation within the city and to “protect the public health, safety, and 
welfare . . . [by] ensur[ing] safe and reliable transportation services.”80 The 
Seattle Ordinance does not classify drivers as independent contractors; 
instead, it simply states that those drivers whom the Supreme Court or 
                                                                                                             
 75. Collective Bargaining, ALF-CIO, https://aflcio.org/what-unions-do/em 
power-workers/collective-bargaining [https://perma.cc/7KAX-LP7U] (last visited 
Feb. 7, 2019). 
 76. Jon Steingart, Seattle Law Allowing Uber, Lyft Drivers to Unionize Is 
Blocked, DAILY LAB. REP. (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.bna.com/seattle-law-
allowing-n73014463849/; Lisa Milam-Perez, Seattle’s Uber organizing 
ordinance enjoined for now, EMP. L. DAILY, http://www.employmentlawdaily 
.com/index.php/news/seattles-uber-organizing-ordinance-enjoined-for-now/ 
[https://perma.cc/SFA8-9VD3] (last visited Feb. 7, 2019). 
 77. Clark v. City of Seattle, No. C17-0382RSL, 2017 WL 3641908, at *4 
(W.D. Wash. Aug. 24, 2017). The Ordinance did not declare that rideshare drivers 
are independent contractors; instead, the Directive declares that drivers who are 
classified as independent contractors, either by the courts or Congress, can engage 
in collective bargaining. Id. 
 78. Seattle Medium, City of Seattle Implementing For-hire Driver Collective 
Bargaining Law, SEATTLE MEDIUM (June 17, 2016), http://seattlemedium.com 
/city-seattle-implementing-hire-driver-collective-bargaining-law/ 
[https://perma.cc/VN2T-LHQJ]. 
 79. Frost, supra note 15. 
 80. Id. 




Congress may classify as independent contractors in the future can engage 
in collective bargaining.81  
The Seattle Ordinance authorizes the Seattle Department of Finance 
and Administration Services to issue rules that govern these union 
organizing efforts.82 Procedurally, the Director of Finance and 
Administrative Services, whom the Seattle mayor appoints, acts as the 
bargaining process coordinator to ensure that the bargaining agreement 
aligns with the city’s goals.83 The Ordinance further gives the Director the 
authority to send parties to arbitration when a violation occurs84 and the 
ability to assess and enforce consequences for improper conduct.85 The 
Seattle Ordinance highlights the continued need for clarity concerning 
Uber and Lyft drivers because it oversteps NLRA boundaries by 
classifying the drivers as independent contractors upfront.  
II. CLARK V. CITY OF SEATTLE STIRS THE POT 
A group of for-hire drivers challenged the Seattle Ordinance by 
alleging it forced drivers into collective bargaining units and limited the 
drivers’ freedom of speech.86 The drivers filed suit in the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Washington and argued that the 
NLRA, the First Amendment, and the Drivers’ Protection Privacy Act 
preempted the Seattle Ordinance—therefore, it was unconstitutional.87 
The drivers filed suit after Teamsters Local 117 (“Teamsters”), a 
union that supports for-hire drivers,88 notified rideshare companies of its 
intention to begin organizing the drivers and hopefully become their 
bargaining representative.89 Unions such as Teamsters typically start the 
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collective bargaining process by initiating a union-organizing campaign to 
gain enough support for a successful certification election.90 The union 
must show that at least 30% of that employer’s employees support the 
campaign to hold a certification election.91 Teamsters thus sought the 
support of local drivers to hold a certification election.92 
The plaintiff drivers argued that two sections of the NLRA—§§ 8(e) 
and 8(b)(4)—preempted the Seattle Ordinance because the Seattle 
Ordinance required drivers to unionize and would eventually force drivers 
to abide by a collective bargaining agreement.93 Drivers may not want a 
collective bargaining agreement because it could alter their contract terms 
contrary to their wishes or force businesses to refuse their services if they 
are not part of the collective bargaining unit.94 The first argument was 
based on NLRA § 8(e), which states that employers cannot enter into 
agreements that prevent the employees from engaging with “any other 
person.”95 The district court rejected the § 8(e) argument because no harm 
had yet occurred.96 Teamsters had not organized, meaning there was no 
union that drivers were being forced to join.97 
The plaintiffs’ second argument was that the Seattle Ordinance 
violated § 8(b)(4) because it forced the drivers to abide by a collective 
bargaining agreement.98 Section 8(b)(4) states that “it [is] an unfair labor 
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practice for a labor organization to ‘threaten, coerce, or restrain any person 
engaged in commerce . . . .’”99 Although § 8(b)(4) does not require an 
agreement before a conflict arises, the court ruled that the conflict with the 
Seattle Ordinance was not ripe for suit because the drivers had not been 
“injured.”100 It was unclear if Teamsters would unionize and what effect it 
would have if the drivers chose to join; therefore, the court reasoned the 
drivers had no cause of action.101 
The court also struck down the plaintiffs’ argument that including 
independent contractors made the Seattle Ordinance unconstitutional.102 
Ultimately, the court based its decision on state law, but the court dismissed 
this argument because the controlling Ninth Circuit allowed the unionization 
of public employees, a group of workers the NLRA also excludes.103 
Notable, however, is the distinction between public employees and 
independent contractors—although independent contractors are specifically 
excluded from the definition of employee, the NLRA excludes public 
employees by excluding public employers rather than employees.104 The 
groups are different, but the Washington court concluded the difference was 
irrelevant and dismissed the plaintiff’s preemption claim because the 
NLRA’s labor organization definition is “unambiguous.”105 If the NLRA 
does not include or specifically excludes a group from NLRA protections, 
the NLRA does not preempt the regulation because the group does not 
constitute a labor organization.106 Two days after the final judgment, the 
plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit.107 On August 9, 2018, a three-judge 
panel for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the court’s ruling that the NLRA and 
First Amendment claims were not ripe for suit.108 
Clark raises two important issues. The first is whether the NLRA 
preempts the Seattle Ordinance and the inherent conflicts between federal, 
state, and local labor laws that regulate independent contractors. The 
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second issue is whether regulation of for-hire drivers should occur at the 
federal, state, or local level.109 
A. Preemption and Its Effect on Labor Regulations 
The Supremacy Clause mandates that state and local labor laws yield 
to federal regulation.110 State and local governments, however, may 
promulgate their own labor laws as long as those laws do not interfere with 
the NLRB’s jurisdiction or the Congressional regulation over the 
unionizing and collective bargaining of employees.111 
Federal labor law preemption comprises two parts—one based on 
jurisdiction and the other based on the NLRA occupation of the field of 
labor relations.112 The U.S. Supreme Court held in San Diego Building 
Trades Council v. Garmon that the NLRB, rather than state courts, has 
primary jurisdiction to decide unfair labor practice claims.113 In Lodge 76, 
International Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. 
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, the Supreme Court held 
that the NLRA also preempts state law when Congress intended for the 
activity to be left to economic forces.114 Therefore, the NLRA preempts 
state laws that interfere with the field of labor intended for federal 
regulation.115 
The Garmon doctrine does not preempt the Seattle Ordinance in Clark 
because the plaintiffs in Clark did not allege a valid unfair labor 
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practice.116 Instead, Clark implicates the Machinists doctrine and asks 
whether the NLRA preempts the regulation of independent contractors’ 
collective bargaining rights because the NLRA occupies the field of labor 
relations in general.117 In Machinists, an employer filed an unfair labor 
practice charge against the union and claimed the union member’s refusal 
to work overtime violated the NLRA.118 The employer also filed the same 
charge with the state employment agency.119 The Supreme Court 
concluded that the Congressional intent behind the NLRA preempted the 
state regulatory agency from policing the employer–employee 
relationship.120 The Congressional intent underlying NLRA regulation is 
explicitly stated in the NLRA’s language because Congress defined 
employee and labor organization, excluding independent contractors from 
coverage.121 If Congress chose not to include a group of workers, or to 
specifically exclude a group, the NLRA arguably does not regulate that 
group.122 
The Seattle Ordinance does not declare that drivers are independent 
contractors. Instead, the Seattle Ordinance allows drivers that courts or 
legislation may later categorize as independent contractors to unionize.123 If 
the NLRA governs the regulation of rideshare drivers, the Seattle Ordinance 
is preempted.124 If the NLRA does not govern the regulation of rideshare 
drivers, the Seattle Ordinance may be enforceable but still lends itself to 
other constitutional arguments, such as First Amendment complications.125 
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This conclusion, however, is still dependent on whether rideshare drivers 
are employees or independent contractors.126 
1. The Split That Causes Polar Opposite Results 
Currently, the Second and Ninth Circuits are split over whether the 
NLRA’s definition of labor organization implicates the Machinists 
doctrine and allows the NLRA to encompass independent contractor 
bargaining units regardless of the NLRA’s exclusion of independent 
contractors from the definition of employee.127 Because of this split 
between the circuit courts, one circuit could deem the Seattle Ordinance 
constitutional and another unconstitutional.128 
The Ninth Circuit restricted the definition of labor organization to the 
NLRA’s specific language and refused to expand NLRA coverage to 
groups beyond the NLRA’s definitions.129 In Pacific Maritime Association 
v. Local 63, International Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, the 
Ninth Circuit—the controlling circuit for Seattle—had to determine 
whether there was a violation of the NLRA because of the prohibition on 
secondary boycotts.130 The court first had to categorize a “public sector 
union” for purposes of NLRA coverage.131 The public sector union in this 
case was comprised of a group of Los Angeles port pilots who wanted to 
engage in collective bargaining.132 The union represented employees of a 
state employee political subdivision; thus, the union did not represent 
employees the NLRA covered.133 The Ninth Circuit held that the Los 
Angeles port pilots did not constitute an NLRA “labor organization” 
because the NLRA’s labor organization definition only includes 
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employees.134 The port pilots worked in the public sector and belonged to 
another group the NLRA definition of employee specifically excluded.135 
The court’s decision allowed the port pilots to organize without running 
into preemption issues with the NLRA; therefore, the court reasoned, the 
NLRA cannot regulate the unionization of non-employees.136 
The Second Circuit faced the same secondary boycott prohibition 
issue but reached the opposite conclusion in Marriott In-Flite Services v. 
Local 504, Air Transportation Division, Transportation Workers of 
America.137 The Second Circuit looked beyond the NLRA’s language and 
relied on legislative intent to conclude that groups the NLRA does not 
define still fall within the definition of “labor organization” and are 
therefore subject to NLRA regulation.138 In Marriott, an employer sued a 
local union of airline employees organized under the Railway Labor Act 
(“RLA”), a federal statute separate from the NLRA, for damages from a 
secondary boycott.139 The Second Circuit considered whether this RLA 
union was a labor organization under the NLRA.140 The court relied on 
legislative history behind the 1947 amendments to the NLRA in 
concluding that the airline employees constituted an NLRA labor 
organization and therefore the NLRA could regulate them.141 The court 
held that the amendment intended to include groups like the airline 
employee union under NLRA coverage, and therefore there was no 
preemption issue and the union could be federally regulated.142 As a result, 
the airline employees were held to NLRA standards on collective 
bargaining. 
The Ninth Circuit decided Pacific Maritime after Marriott, noting that 
its conclusion was different.143 In highlighting the difference, the Ninth 
Circuit cited a Supreme Court case that resolved the question of whether 
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groups the NLRA’s definitions excluded are still considered labor 
organizations and preempted the group’s collective bargaining and 
unionizing efforts.144 
2. The Supreme Court’s Footnote 
The 1947 amendments to the NLRA excluded independent 
contractors, as well as others, from NLRA coverage.145 In Brotherhood of 
Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Company, the Supreme Court 
stated in a footnote that the 1947 Taft–Hartley amendments to the NLRA 
“did not expand the scope of ‘employees’ or ‘labor organizations’ whom 
the [NLRA covers].”146 This footnote asserted that the NLRA does not 
govern groups that the NLRA’s definition of employee specifically 
excludes, and therefore the NLRA does not preempt the groups from 
engaging in collective bargaining activities.147 Although the Second 
Circuit relied on legislative history, it ignored the Supreme Court’s 
restrictive interpretation of employees and labor organizations by 
reasoning that the footnote was mere dicta.148 The Second and Ninth 
Circuit split, therefore, revolves around whether the Supreme Court made 
a binding decision about the preemptive power of the NLRA over 
excluded groups. Although the principle is located in a footnote, the 
Supreme Court unequivocally stated its opinion on the labor organization 
and employee definitions and chose not to expand either.149 Thus, the 
Second Circuit should have abided by the Supreme Court’s decision. 
The Seattle Ordinance at issue in Clark addresses independent 
contractors, a specific group of workers that the 1947 amendments to the 
NLRA chose to exclude.150 Under the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation, the 
Seattle Ordinance does not disrupt Congressional intent or the NLRA’s 
statutory language because it only regulates independent contractors the 
                                                                                                             
 144. Id. 
 145. 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2012). 
 146. Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 377 
(1969). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Marriott In-Flite Servs. v. Local 504, Air Transp. Div., Transp. Workers 
of Am., AFL-CIO, 557 F.2d 295, 299 (2d Cir. 1977) (“This ambiguous dictum, 
contained in a footnote, provides little basis for a major inroad into the national 
labor policy against secondary boycotts.”).  
 149. Brotherhood, 394 U.S. at 377.  
 150. 29 U.S.C. § 152. 




NLRA does not cover.151 The Seattle Ordinance governs a group of 
workers that Congress specifically removed from NLRA coverage, and 
therefore, the NLRA does not preempt the Seattle Ordinance.152 
Consequently, it is constitutional, and local governments may follow suit 
by drafting similar labor laws that regulate rideshare drivers as 
independent contractors.153  
Similar local regulations, however, will only create confusion for 
drivers and rideshare companies because they will have to decipher two 
levels of labor regulation: state or local regulation and the NLRA federal 
regulation. The workers and rideshare companies will be subject to 
organization and collective bargaining in some cities, and possibly states, 
but not in others.154 
B. The Hardest Question Yet: Regulation 
The second issue Clark highlights is whether regulation of the 
rideshare industry should occur at the federal, state, or local level.155 Labor 
law commentators and experts heavily debate this issue.156 Some 
professors argue that filling in gaps in labor regulation should be left to the 
states, but others argue that labor regulation should take place at the federal 
level.157 Addressing the regulation of rideshare drivers is necessary 
because Congress passed the federal labor laws before the advent of the 
gig worker, and the laws have not been amended to account for this new 
economy.158 Rideshare drivers have since become an important part of the 
American workforce; yet the drivers have no protections from 
employers.159 
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1. State or Local Regulation Succumbs to the Rideshare Companies’ 
Political Power 
Some labor law experts advocate that state or local laws should 
regulate labor relations by filling in the gaps federal law leaves.160 
Professor Secunda wrote that state law should fill the gaps that federal 
labor regulation leaves open and play a “complementary role.”161 
Professor Secunda based his argument on the facts that federal regulation 
takes too long to implement162 and that states should have the right to 
regulate employee rights because they can act as laboratories in 
promulgating workplace laws.163 
Although the NLRA does not preempt ordinances like the Seattle 
Ordinance, local regulation of rideshare drivers will result in confusion 
because of differing regulation for the drivers and rideshare companies per 
city or state.164 If every city or state has different regulations, the 
protections of rideshare drivers would vary and create inconsistencies. 
Under varying bargaining agreements, drivers would have different pay, 
hours, and benefits depending on where they work and the terms of the 
collective bargaining agreement.165 Seattle rideshare drivers would likely 
have better working conditions than drivers in a city without labor 
regulations because the Seattle drivers are able to engage in collective 
bargaining.166 This type of regulation creates inconsistencies within the 
rideshare company and among the drivers because each city or state may 
subject the company and its drivers to collective bargaining, leading to 
different pay, hours, benefits, and protections depending on the collective 
bargaining agreement.167  
Local regulation of Uber and Lyft could cause the rideshare companies 
to take their business elsewhere.168 For example, in May 2016, the city of 
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Austin passed a local law that required ride-for-hire companies to 
fingerprint drivers as a hiring practice.169 Shortly after the law passed, 
Uber and Lyft left the city because the law restricted how the companies 
do business.170 The city held a repeal referendum that allowed citizens of 
Austin to reconsider the local law.171 Uber and Lyft advocated strongly 
against the ordinance because it did not allow the companies to hire their 
drivers in a timely fashion.172 Ultimately, Uber and Lyft lost, the Austin 
law passed, and the rideshare companies left the city.173 
Some commentators have argued that local regulations are not a 
problem because Austin had a successful transportation system without 
Uber and Lyft.174 One year after the enactment, however, Texas Governor 
Abbott overturned Austin’s regulation, and Uber and Lyft returned to 
Austin.175 After Uber and Lyft lost the local repeal referendum, state 
legislators successfully lobbied the governor to overturn the Austin 
rideshare regulation after continuous pressure from Uber and Lyft.176 
Although Austin’s transportation system survived without Uber and Lyft 
for one year, the regulation eventually succumbed to rideshare companies’ 
ability to lobby state officials.177 
Local regulation can cause existing rideshare businesses to leave the 
city or use their political power to defeat the local legislation.178 Local 
regulation causes Uber and Lyft to become defensive and heavily lobby 
state officials because the rideshare companies dislike local regulations 
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that cause policy changes from city to city.179 Ultimately, the companies 
dislike inconsistent local regulations and will use political power to lobby 
legislators until the legislation is defeated.180 Cities may be able to enforce 
regulation of rideshare companies, but the rideshare companies have a 
significant interest in preventing or overcoming local regulation if 
necessary—as well as the political power to do both.181 
2. The Upside of Federal Regulation 
Although some scholars argue that city and state laws should govern 
labor practices, other scholars contend that federal regulation would 
introduce much-needed uniformity.182 Federal programs must be “uniform 
in character”; therefore, regulation on the federal level undoubtedly leads 
to uniform enforcement and guidelines.183 In addition to uniformity, the 
Supreme Court held that state law can sometimes further complicate 
federal law objectives when the Court faced a preemption issue in United 
States v. Kimbell Foods.184 In Kimbell Foods, the Supreme Court 
addressed both the preemption and regulation concerns of local or state 
regulations, based on the fact that state laws may frustrate the intent behind 
the federal regulation, but held that state law took precedent without a 
Congressional directive.185 
Jeffrey Hirsch, a labor and employment professor and extensive labor 
law author, advocates for federal regulation of employment and labor laws 
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by promoting “vertical integration.”186 Vertical integration would 
encompass state law into the federal level.187 Hirsch argues that the federal 
government should regulate employment law because federal regulation 
results in a single standard, creating simplicity and avoiding uncertainty 
for employers.188 In the debate about state or federal level regulation, 
Professor Hirsch argues that federal regulation allows for streamlined 
rules because there is only one unit of government.189 Federal regulation 
allows for straightforward enforcement because a single source of 
government regulates nationwide problems through one agency.190 
Because federal regulation results in uniform enforcement, Congress 
should amend the federal laws that govern collective bargaining rights to 
include rideshare drivers. The new American workforce of gig workers 
needs uniform acknowledgment and regulation by Congress.191 The 
NLRA amendment should act as the starting point to address rideshare 
drivers and gig workers in general. With the protection NLRA regulation 
provides through unions, gig workers do not need to be included in other 
federal labor laws.192 Unions, acting as the drivers’ bargaining 
representative, can provide wage and other employment changes through 
collective bargaining.193 
Without federal regulation, rideshare workers will not be protected, 
and employers will be allowed to make unilateral decisions dependent on 
the local government’s decision about unionizing.194 Rideshare companies 
will continue to settle when faced with lawsuits over the classification and 
rights of for-hire drivers; however, federal regulation will stop rideshare 
companies from settling by forcing the companies to address the 
grievances of drivers through collective bargaining.195 
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Federal regulation in other areas, such as medical leave, overtime, and 
wage provisions, has yielded desirable results.196 Congress passed the 
Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) in 1993, allowing workers to 
take unpaid medical leave without repercussions.197 Prior to the FMLA, 
only 34 states had some type of family leave legislation with just 12 of 
those states providing job-protected medical or family leave.198 The 
FMLA’s biggest hurdle was Congressional recognition of the changing 
American workforce and its need for protection.199 In the 1980s and 1990s, 
the workforce change was a “revolutionary influx of women into the 
workforce.”200 Women became significant contributors to household 
income and a vital part of the American workforce.201 Although states can 
and do grant greater protections for workers than the FMLA provides,202 
the FMLA supplied an essential federal floor for both the recognition and 
protection of women as emerging American workers and created uniform 
federal legislation where state regulation lacked.203 
Similar to the regulation of family medical leave, the federal 
government should regulate for-hire drivers to provide uniformity for both 
the drivers and businesses. Like the influx of female workers in the 1980s 
and 1990s, recent years have shown an increase in rideshare drivers.204 
Federal regulation of rideshare workers arguably recognizes a new and 
integral part of the American workforce and provides protections for those 
workers.205 The drivers and rideshare companies will know the designated 
pay, benefits, and union-organizing parameters for all locations rather than 
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having to decipher the regulation from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.206 
Federal regulation allows drivers and businesses alike to rely on one 
source of labor regulation rather than the varying laws of countless cities 
or states.207 
Additionally, if rideshare drivers can organize and bargain, workers 
do not need the protections of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 
FMLA, and other labor regulations.208 The drivers can negotiate through 
unions to protect themselves from potential violations of other labor 
laws.209 Congress passed minimum wage and medical leave laws initially 
because of the large percentage of workers unions do not represent.210 
Drivers’ collective bargaining rights ensure a new class of workers are 
protected without the promulgation of new law. The solution begins with 
the NLRA, but it can filter into other employment laws as time passes and 
the need arises to amend other federal laws.211 
III. THE FIRST STEP 
There are three possible solutions to the issue of regulating rideshare 
drivers: (1) to include independent contractors under NLRA coverage; (2) 
to declare a middle-ground status between independent contractors and 
employees; or (3) to amend the NLRA to include gig workers in the 
definition of employee. An NLRA amendment is the best solution because 
it recognizes the importance of gig workers and provides protections for 
rideshare drivers.212 
A. The Inclusion of Independent Contractors 
One solution is to amend the NLRA to once again include independent 
contractors as employees. In 1947, Congress passed the Taft–Hartley Act, 
which amended the NLRA to exclude specifically independent 
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contractors.213 Congress excluded independent contractors because of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Silk.214 In Silk, the Supreme 
Court decided whether coal “unloaders” and truckers were employees or 
independent contractors; the Court ultimately held that the unloaders were 
employees and the truckers independent contractors because of their 
“economic realities.”215 The economic realities test, replacing earlier tests, 
relies on “economic facts,” such as employer control and type of work, to 
determine whether the relationship is one of employment or an 
independent business enterprise.216 After Silk, big business advocates 
lobbied Congress successfully to exclude independent contractors, with 
Congress relying heavily on the Silk economic realities test to decide that 
independent contractors did not qualify for NLRA protections.217 
An amendment to the NLRA including independent contractors would 
be reflective of the recent increase in gig workers.218 Simply including all 
independent contractors, however, is nearly impossible. Big businesses 
benefit from hiring independent contractors, and business owners do not 
want every independent contractor to have NLRA rights.219 Independent 
contractor status allows businesses to avoid employer-provided benefits, 
taxes, and workers’ compensation insurance.220 The Taft–Hartley 
amendments that excluded independent contractors were a direct result of 
big business pressure to balance out the previous NLRA restrictions placed 
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on employers.221 The amendments aimed to balance the interests of 
employers with the interest of unions.222 Additionally, an amendment to 
the NLRA that includes all independent contractors may not be politically 
viable because pro-employer and pro-union groups are constantly 
fighting.223 NLRA legislation is a consistent push and pull of employer 
and union efforts to provide the best legislation for the corresponding 
side.224 Including all independent contractors could create a domino effect, 
as the regulation would likely overlap with other federal statutes related to 
employment, like the FLSA and Title VII. This result would be hard to 
predict and could affect minimum wage or workplace discrimination.225 
B. Declaring a Middle Ground 
As opposed to including all independent contractors, Congress could 
declare a hybrid or middle-ground status for gig workers.226 A hybrid 
status would land between the classification of employee and independent 
contractor.227 “Dependent contractor” status is a middle ground between 
employee and independent contractor, which allows workers to depend on 
their employer but still maintain some control over their employment.228 
Recent employment law scholarship proposes that Uber and Lyft drivers 
should be considered dependent contractors under the FLSA, which 
provides worker protections such as minimum wage.229 Declaring 
dependent contractor status alone, however, does not solve the problem of 
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for-hire drivers’ collective bargaining rights.230 Simply identifying a new 
type of worker without legislation causes more uncertainty about gig 
workers’ employment status because it is still unclear whether workers in 
the rideshare industry fit within the NLRA’s definition of employee.231 
C. An Amendment to Include Gig Workers 
Instead of including independent contractors or declaring a hybrid 
category, Congress should amend the NLRA’s definition of employee to 
include gig workers under NLRA protections. Amending the NLRA’s 
definition of employee is the most ideal solution because gig workers are 
a substantial part of the American workforce. Further, employers can 
continue to hire independent contractors, and the amendment ends the 
ongoing classification debate. The NLRA amendment should read: “The 
term ‘employee’ shall include any employee, as well as any worker that 
relies on smartphone applications to complete an on-demand service and 
may perform this work for a temporary or inconsistent basis.” 
1. Gig Workers Here to Stay 
This amendment strikes the perfect balance between protecting gig 
workers and recognizing the benefits employers gain from hiring 
independent contractors.232 Including gig workers in the NLRA recognizes 
a growing part of the American workforce and gives gig workers the 
chance to effectively defend their rights under labor laws, as well as 
providing a foundation for protections under other federal labor laws.233 A 
study by Intuit predicts that the amount of Americans working in the on-
demand economy will double by 2020 with 43% of the American 
workforce becoming a part of the on-demand economy.234 The shift in the 
American job economy toward gig work will continue as more Americans 
seek the benefits of extra pay from side jobs.235 Gig workers are a different 
class of independent contractors from the independent contractors 
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contemplated when Congress passed the NLRA.236 To protect gig workers, 
the NLRA definition of employee should specifically encompass this 
growing part of the American workforce. 
2. Employers Still Win 
Rideshare companies do not want rideshare drivers to be classified as 
employees because the status as independent contractors allows the 
companies to maximize profit.237 Uber and Lyft’s business models rely on 
drivers being independent contractors because the companies maximize 
profit by not providing benefits or workers insurance.238 Additionally, 
rideshare companies are not liable for payroll taxes or negligent acts by 
independent contractor drivers.239 The amendment only includes gig 
workers under NLRA regulations. Rideshare companies, therefore, may 
still avoid NLRA regulation and other federal employment regulations—
like the FMLA and the FLSA—by hiring drivers specifically deemed as 
independent contractors.240 The benefit of hiring independent contractors 
is why employers passionately lobbied to exclude independent contractors 
from the NLRA’s definition of employee.241 Amending the NLRA 
definition of employee to include gig workers still allows employers to 
hire independent contractors that are not gig workers without 
repercussions; employers will be restricted only in their treatment of gig 
workers.242 
3. NLRA was Always the Starting Point 
Including gig workers specifically in the NLRA definition of 
employee begins to resolve the dispute over rideshare drivers’ 
classification and is a starting point for protecting gig workers.243 Congress 
passed the NLRA to protect private sector rights and later passed the FLSA 
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and FMLA to address the issues left unprotected by the NLRA.244 Just as 
the NLRA laid the foundation to protect private sector workers’ rights, the 
amendment would create protections for America’s new class of 
workers.245 An NLRA definition of gig workers must be within the 
definition of employee to fully protect rideshare drivers’ collective 
bargaining rights.246 An amendment of the NLRA definition gives gig 
workers a freestanding definition within the classification of employee for 
purposes of labor rights.247 Additionally, Congress and states may 
continue to provide more protection through other statutes.248 
4. Mirroring the European Union 
European Union labor laws, in contrast to U.S. labor law, yields a very 
progressive union-friendly workforce.249 The European Commission is 
tasked with promulgating and amending labor laws that provide worker 
rights and freedoms.250 The amendment should mirror the objectives 
behind the European Union’s 2008 Directive on Temporary Agency Work 
(“Directive”).251 The Directive aimed to balance the protections of 
temporary workers with the reality that employers have specific reasons 
to employ workers or contract out the work.252 Congress should amend the 
NLRA’s definition of employee to include “any worker that relies on 
smartphone applications to complete an on-demand service and may 
perform this work on a temporary or inconsistent basis.” This amendment 
accomplishes goals similar to those the European Union’s Directive 
achieved.253 After the European Union passed the Directive, a new type of 
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worker was recognized and given significant protections.254 Likewise, the 
amendment would allow gig workers to engage in collective bargaining 
without opening the flood gates to all independent contractors.255 
Amending the definition of employee to encompass gig workers 
presents similar political problems as amending the NLRA to include 
independent contractors.256 Including gig workers in the definition of 
employee, however, is the middle-ground. Amending the definition of 
employee allows for federal regulation of workers that need to be protected 
but also provides businesses the opportunity to oppose unions through the 
election process. The amendment would still allow businesses to reap the 
benefits of employing independent contractors other than gig workers 
because they remain excluded from NLRA protections. Additionally, gig 
workers would remain excluded from the protections of other labor laws. 
Amending the definition of employee to include gig workers is the best 
solution for solving the labor law preemption and regulatory issues 
presented in Clark.257 Until then, local ordinances allowing cities to 
promulgate their own classification of Uber and Lyft drivers are 
constitutional, and this discrepancy leads to problematic regulation on a 
city-by-city or state-by-state basis. 
CONCLUSION 
In Clark, a Washington district court ruled on a local labor law that 
was designed to be the first of its kind.258 The court discussed labor law 
preemption and regulation issues that have been part of an ongoing 
national debate. Uber and Lyft drivers represent a new group of “gig 
workers” who are part of the employee versus independent contractor 
classification debate and do not have collective bargaining rights or 
protections.259 The Seattle Ordinance, however, represents a local measure 
that successfully created a workaround for the misclassification debate that 
allowed drivers who are independent contractors to engage in collective 
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bargaining and unionizing.260 No matter what classification ride-for-hire 
drivers are given, therefore, the drivers can engage in collective bargaining 
and union representation. 
The best solution to the regulation issue concerning rideshare drivers 
is to amend the NLRA’s employee definition to include gig workers. An 
amendment would recognize a growing part of the American workforce, 
allow employers to continue benefitting from hiring independent 
contractors, and end the ongoing debate concerning whether rideshare 
drivers are employees or independent contractors.261 The amendment 
would accomplish two important goals: recognition of the new workforce 
and the opportunity for drivers to engage in collective bargaining to protect 
themselves from adverse employer decisions. 
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